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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of increasing the safety of airplanes by 
reducing the fire hazards is one of the most important prob-
lems in the designing of aircraft and aircraft engines, as 
also for the further development of air traffic. 
So long as only light-oil or carburetor engines are 
available for aircraft, there will always be danger of fire 
due to the imflarnmability of the light fuels. This is also 
true of airship engines using power gas. It is of secondary 
importance as to how thefuei is conducted to the engine 
cylinders during operation. Since fuel and oil must be lo-
6ated somewhere on the aircraft, fire can be easily started 
and spread by them. This possibility will likewise continue 
to exist in the use of heavy-oil engines (high-pressure and 
low-pressure Diesel engines) on aircraft. The fire hazards 
will be considerably reduced, however, ,due to the lower in-
flammability of the fuel. 
We r2ust consider not only the danger of fire from the 
liquid fuel, but also the danger of explosion from the mix-
ture of fuel and air. Such explosive mixtures are always 
liable to form under the engine cowling or in the tank com-
partments due to leaks in the fuel system. Under certain 
conditions this is :articulariy liable to happen with ether, 
gasoline and benzol(benzene). Explosive mixtures form less 
readily with heavy oils than with light. oils. The chances 
of the formation of explOsive mixtures from the evaporation 
of lubricating oils are about the same, as for heavy fuel oils. 
The following discussion is at first restricted to the 
light-oil engines nor,, in use. ' We shall .consider how far it 
* U Ehung der Si oh çrheit von. Liftfahrzeug en durchBekmpfung 
der Brandgefahr.H Prom Zeitschrift f1!r Flugtechnik und 'Motor- 
luftschiff.hrt, published by R. Old.enbourg, Munich and Berlin, 
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is possible to reduce the fire ha.zards by changes in the de-
sign of the engines arid carbrtors and in the-arrangement 
of the fuel pi-pes. 
The develo pment of aircraft and aircraft engines has 
shown that, aside from the magnetos which are essential in 
light-oil engines, more and uore.electrical apparatus is re-
quired, partly for lighting and radio and partly for the 
operation of recording instrthents., etc. These constitute 
additional fire hazards, especially in the event of a short 
circuit or break. The use of electrical apparatus, however, 
will probably continue to increase. 
Fire may also be caused by lightning, though this is 
very seldom. On commercial aircraft allowance must blsô1be 
made for the carelesness of the passengers (smoking in the 
cabin when no special smoking compartment is provided). 
Loreover, the fire hazards are greatly increased on airships 
by the use of hydrogen as the lifting gas. Helium should be 
used whenever possible. 
From the foregoing it is obvious that fire hazards 
still exist on aircraft. They can however be greatly re-
duced. We shall consider all the known and possible causes 
of fire and the best form and arrangement of that part of 
the equipment designed for its prevention and xtinction. 
This investigation is based on accident statistics and ex-
perimental data. Figure 1 represents graphically the air-
craft-fire statistics for the period of 1926 to 1929. The 
accidents involving fire constituted only about 2% of the 
whole number of accidents. 
II. CAUSES OF FIRE
In the Air 
On an aircraft in flight various causes may start a 
fire, which spreads rapidly when there is fuel at hand. 
Food for a fire that has once been started is always present 
under the engine cowling, even with the very best care and 
ventilation, in the form of drops of fuel and oil and even, 
under some conditions, in. the form of an explosive mixture 
of fuel and air. Oil almost always collects in the cowling 
and on the engine while the latter is running. Fuel always 
collects in the vicinity-of leaky joints. It may also ha p
-pen that fuel or oil p rom loose connections may penetrate 
the engine space in the form of a fine spray, since most of 
the fuel and oil pipes are under compression.	 .
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More dangerous still is the collection of large quan-
tities of fuel in'the engine cowling from a leaky carburetor 
or fuel pump, which are generally inside the cowling, or 
from the rupture of a fuel or oil pipe. An explosive mix-
ture of fuel and air may then be very quickly formed under 
the hood. The entire space inside the engine cowlin can 
be filled with flames in a very short time. Such a fire is 
very serious and can be extinguished. only by the most power-
ful means. 
Since fuel and oil are always present inside the engine 
cowling, it only requires a spark, an open flame, or simply 
the contact of the liQuid, with a hot part of the engine, to 
start a fire. The danger from an open flame usually in the 
form of so-called "back fires," is often underestimated. As 
soon as they notice fire or smoke, many pilots, on the as-
suimtion that it comes from the carburetor, immediately open 
the throttle wide while simultaneously closing the fire cock, 
so that the flames will be drawn back into the cylinders by 
the greater•
 noative pressure. Carburetor fires have often 
been extinguished in this manner. This mthod can not be 
recommended however and should generally be avoided. It 
should be employed only in an emergency where there is no 
other way to combat the fire. 
Back-firing may result from any of the following causes 
a) Failure, of camshaft; 
b) Failure of control lever (seizing at bearing 
point);
c) Failure of a valve; 
d) Foreign substances between valve head and. seat, 
e.g., in the failure of 'a piston pin or connecting rod 
or in the seizing of a piston when the crumbled pieces 
prevent the valve from cloing'"tightly; 
e) Too rich or too poor fuel mixture; 
f) Poor mixing due to cold engine or insufficient 
preliminary heating; 
g) Leaky heating device, making it possible for 
th'e exhaust flame, to ignite the mixture in the intake 
pip e or even to penetrate into the engine space; 
li) Overiea,ting of- the cylinder head or bottom,
4	 N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 628 
through insufficient cooling in air-cooled engines, or per-. 
haps from the formation of steam pockets in water-cooled 
engines which may cause seizing of the -piston. 
If the back fire penetrates the carburetor it finds 
abundant fuel in the float chanber and quickly escapes 
through small leaks to the outside where the fuel and oil 
deposits assist the flames to spread further. Moreover, 
the back-fire flames may pass through one of the air inlets 
into the engine compartment, especially when the passages 
through the engine cowling have not been well fitted to the 
inlet pipes, and the flames are driven back into the engine 
compartment by the wind. The strength of the back fire in-
creases with the size of the carburetor and'with the inside 
diameter of the inlet pipes. 
In.the event of a crankshaft or connecting-rod break, 
•a fire can be started by back fires caused by a sudden in-
crease or decrease in the revolution speed of the engine. 
In this case the flames may find ample nouris1ment from an 
easily possible fuel-pipe-break, since such injuries are 
generally accompanied by strong backward shocks. Figure 2. 
shows the result of an accident in which the rupture of a 
piston and connecting rod started a fire in the, engine com-
partment. The engine may be suddenly stopped by the seizing 
of a piston mid the piston head may be broken •by. the force of 
the •explcsion. The oil vapors may take fire and penetrate 
into the engine compartment and there continue to spread. 
Fire may also be caused by the breaking off or rupture of an 
exhaust pipe thus allowing the exhaust flames to enter the 
engine compartment. 
Moreover, the deposits of fuel and oil on the engine 
and in the engine compartment may be ignited through damages 
to the electric equipment as, e.g., by a spark from a .broken 
cable in contact with the engine, or by a spark from a poor-
ly insulated wire in the vicinity of fuel deposits. Fire 
may also be started by sparks from the radio or other elec-
tric equipment (lighting system, instruments, etc.). 
Fire may also be caused by frictional electricity gen-
erated by the flow of inflammable liquids through metal 
pipes. Exhaustive experiments in this connection were per-
formed, by Professor Dolezaleck at the Berlin-Oharlottenburg 
Polytechnic School.* Tensions of 100 to 1200 volts were 
produced with a small tank and 0.2 liter of gasoline, which 
was forced by compressed air through a nozzle attached to 
_____ 
B. huller: '1 Bildung von Elektrj.zjtat in Rohrleitungen Hr 
fl{!i,ssige Kraftstoffe. 11
 Auto-Technik, Vol. 14 (1925), p. 20.
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the tank, Especially strong electric tensions are produced 
by the rupture of tanks or pipes when a jet of escaping 
fuel strikes the wall of a tank, and. is partially atomized. 
Aftera! brief strong friction, fuel separates from the jet 
and strikes against another part of the tank wall where the 
voltage is equalized, by a spark. Frictional electricity 
may alo.be roduced. by the flowing of gases through pipes, 
e.g. in the muffler. It is not probable, however, that 
such sparks can ignite a mixture of fuel and air or even 
liquid fuel. This must be determined by experinientation. 
Since frictional electricity is always generated in the 
tearing of materials, the rupture of tanks and pipes may 
producearks, aside from the possibility of spark pro- 
duction by the flowing fuel. 
Fuel and oil deposits on hot engine parts (e.g.. pre-
lirainary-heating devices, cylinder parts.and esp•ecially 
exhaust :pipes close to the Ongine).may ignite. Explosive: 
m.xturos of fuel and air ignite still more readily. The 
danger is much greater in stunt and inverted flying be-. 
cause the normally low, fuel pipes are then above so that 
escaping fuel is more liable to come in contact with the 
exhaust pipes. 
A few preliminary tests were made in order to determine 
thi,




Ignition Temperatures of Fuels on Hot Metal 
Fuels Oils 
'-;- Volto]. 
No. line oil oil j	 hal 
19/30 197/29
 
Y 'Y Y Y	 Y=I ly 0.714 0.730 0.8950.881 0
' 813 ' 1	 0860 0.930 0.933 
0 0 00 C 00 00	 00 1	 00 00. 
1 400 5701'610 620 650	 . '700 540 610 
2 410 560	 . 600 . 600 625	 -	 690 510 550
The exp erimental apparatus consisted of a flat copper 
pan 4 mm (0.16 in.) thic].ç and about. 140- ram (5.5 in.) in 
diameter, a. calibrated iron- consta.tan thermocouple being 
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applied in the middle for taking the temperature. The, pan 
was heated by means of a fine-pointed gas flame. About 
1 ni 3
 (0.061 cu.in .) of fuel was put in the pan for each 
test. For most of the tests thepan was heated dull red; 
for bcnzol, bright red. These temperatures occur in the 
inner engine parts, such as' valve heads. On the outer parts 
(exhaust pipes, cylinder heads, heating devices, etc.,) sich 
temperatures seldom occur. 
• Nevertheless, special conditions may occur which will 
cause'a fire hazard.. E.g., when an airplane crashes, fuel 
or oil may flow directly into, an exhaust pipe and the re-
sulting mixture v'ith the air may be ignited by a hot valve 
or a glowing particle of rust.* 
Exhaustive tests on the temperatures of engine parts, 
both on the test stand and in flight, and on the possibili-
ties of ignition of the most common fuels and oils on hot 
engine oarts'will be made in the near future at the D.V.L. 
(German Experimental Institute for Aeronautics). A few such 
test's have already been made. (Table II.) 
TABLE II

Temperature's of the Exhaust Pipes of a

B.M.W. Va Engine on the Test Stand 
--- 
Exhaust gases I	 Outside 'wall 
Date	 Time ----- 
--- 1------------	 r.p.m. 
P.M.	 Test points 
1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3 
oc	 00	 00
	 oc°C	 00 
9/16/30 l:38 775 740 7,60 240 330 270 1640 
9/16/30 2:00 770 730 730 240 270 280 1612 
9/16/30 2:30 775 735 740 235 370 285 107 
9/16/30 3:00 770 730 740 232	 , 360 .280 1614 
Temperature of surrounding air 19 0 0 (66.20F.).
*0. P. Ta,rlor 'and E. S. Taylor: "Crash Fire Tests with Diesel 
Oil."	 Aviation, IT.Y., Vol. 29 (1930), No. 5, p. 283. 
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum Na. 628 	 7 
In a further stand test with an Sh 14 air-cooled engine 
a mean outside temp erature- of about 15000 (302 0 F.) was found 
on the exhaust pipes. The engine ran without exhaust mani-
fold. The velocity of the cooling air was about 130 km (81 
miles) per hour. The temperature measurements will 
be 
con-
tinued with several engine types, both on the stand and in 
flight. 
In connection with this test, it was purposed to deter-
mine whether the exhaust pipes would ignite fuel-or oil. 
The tests were made on a D.V.L. fire-extinguisher test stand 
with a running Mercedes D 3 a engine. Above all it was de-
sired to determine in what form the fuel or oil strikes the 
hot engine part when it bursts into flame, whether in drops 
or jets or in larger quantities. The temperatures on the 
exhaust pipes were about 350 0 C (662 0F.). The fuel or oil 
could not be made to ignite in any of the tests by bringing 
it into contact with the exhaust pipes. Even after the gas-
oline pipes had been brought close to the exhaust pipes, so 
that the fuel was brought into contact with still hotter 
parts, no ignition occurred. Since no general conclusion 
can be drawn from this test, a continuation of the tests is 
desirable. 
The fire hazard from lightning is certainly greater 
than has hitherto been assumed. In the 1930 D.V.L. yearbook, 
in the report "Von den Gefahren des Luftmeeres," H. Koppe 
cites several cases in which fire was started on an aircraft 
by lightning. During the war lightning often set fire to 
airships and captive balloons. The latter were even set on 
fire in hot weather by atmospheric electricity before a 
storm. 
Moreover, carelessness like the dropping of a cigarette 
stub may start a fire in the cabin which may spread to the 
pilot room and the fuel compartments. Easily inflammable 
articles carried by the passengers constitute a fire hazard. 
Smoking should be absolutely prohibited on airships using 
hydrogen as the lifting gas and on wooden airplanes. On 
metal airplanes smoking should be allowed only in specially 
shielded compartments.
On the Ground 
Ground fires include those started on the ground after 
a crash or hard landing. Of course a landing may be neces-
sitated by a fire which has already started in the air and 
which may spread- further after landing. Ground fires are
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far yntore dangerous than fires in the air because the danger 
of fuel tanks exploding is greater and because there is 
hardly any chance of ext.nguishing then.. 
In the forced landing of an airDlane on unsuitable 
ground, various parts of t"-,:e airplane, such as the landing 
gear, wings. or the engine bearer are d.amaged by the sudden 
impact. Pipes may be broken, tanks torn loos.e and hot 
engine parts, like the exhaust manifold, be broken off. 
The fuel .r.ay then pour over the latter and set, the whole 
air-,--)lane on fire within a few seconds. In the accident 
shown in Figure 3, no fire resulted though it is,obvious 
that fuel from the tank x-x might easily have come in con-
tact with hot engine parts. Fire m
., 
ay also be started by a 
spark from the breaking of a structral part. In ground 
fires the whole airplaiie is generally destroyed and lives 
are often lost. Ground fires may also result from other 
causes, e.g. when an aircraft in landing comes in contact 
with high-voltage conductors. A ground fire may be started 
by a back fire due to a sudden reduction in the speed of the 
engine, or to its stopping altogether when the airplane 
strikes the ground. Even the exhaust flames may start a 
fire when there is fuel in their vicinity. 
Ground fires are even more dangerous on hydrogen-filled 
airships than on airplanes. If an airshi p is forced to land 
in stormy weather, it is liable to be driven against the 
ground by a sudden gust. The engine nacelles may then be 
demolished, the fuel tanks loosened, the piping broken and 
fire started as on an airplane. The airship can thus be 
quickly destroyed. Such was the case of the British airship 
R 101 destroyed in France in 1930. The danger is still 
greater in the case of a hydrogen-filled airship with power 
gas for the engines, in that some ruptured part of the struc-
ture may penetrate a lifting-gas or power-gas container and 
allow the escaping gas to take fire. 
In 1925 crash tost were made in America in order to 
determine the causes of fire and its spread in the impact 
of an airplane against tho ground. 	 ing1ess. airplanes were 
run down a slope having a gradient of 25% (1:4). At the 
bottom of the slope a level stretch of about 20 m (66 ft.) 
led to a concrete wall against which the airplane crashed. 
On each side of the concrete wall there were thick protect-
ing walls behind which a motion-picture camera was operated. 
As the airplane was started off the tail was lifted by a 
special device so that the engine was flooded with fuel. 
In 14 crashes there were 5 fires caused by fuel coming in' 
contact : with the hot exhaust pipes. The exhaust'manifolds
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were then modified and the tests repeated. We have no in-
formation regarding the changes in the exhaust pipes nor re-
garding the further tests. Neither is the temp erature of 
the exhaust pipes known. 
Fires during Adjustment of Aircraft in Hangar 
Even when an airplane is being inspected and adjusted 
in the hangar the fire hazard is very great. In overhauling 
an airplane all fuel and oil pipes are inspected. In loos-
ening the connections fuel escapes into the engine compart-
ment. Since, however, the airplane is not to be flown im-
mediately 'the mechanic is-not so careful to avoid the scat-
tering of fuel. It can then be found not only in many plac-
es under the engine hood, but even on the floor and walls of 
the cockpit. In working on the ignition system a spark may 
be generated which is liable to start a fire. 
In getting the airplane ready in 'the space in front of 
the hangar fire may ensue from a back fire in starting the 
engine due to the excessive richness of the fuel mixture and 
the resultant slow combustion in the intake pipe 'through 
which it gets into the carburetor. Due to the customary 
previous flooding of the carburetor the back fire finds a-
bundant food. Excessive richness of the fuel in starting 
the engine may be duo to the previous flooding of the carbu-
retor and the injection of fuel into the cylinders in order 
to facilitate starting.. 
III. FIRE PREVENTION 
In order to reduce the above-mentioned fire hazards to 
a minimum it is necessary for aircraft constructors and keep- 
ers and especially designers to give sufficient attention to 
the subordinate structural parts. The fire hazards must also 
receive consideration, however, in the design of the engine 
and carburetor in order to secure the best results. 
Design.of• Carburetor and Engine 
The most commonly used float carburetor has the d.isad-o 
vantage that the fuel in the float' chamber furnishes abun-
dant food for the back fire,. especially when there is lack 
of tightness. This 'disadvantage can be partially remedied 
by using the floatless type. of carburetor in which there 'is
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no large fuel supply,. although it is possible, as in a float 
carburetor, for fuel to leak and take fire. The floatless 
carburetor can not entirely eliminate the danger of carburet-
or fires, however, because back fires can still occur. Only 
the direct injection of the fuel into the cylinder by means 
of an injection pump, as in Diesel engines, can eliminate 
this hazard. The Diesel method has already been successfully 
applied in other countries and is now being investigated in 
several German factories. On account of the general interest 
in the subject, the D.V.L. is about to experiment with gaso-
line injection. The greatest reduction in engine fires and 
the maximum degree of safety can obviously be attained only 
by the Diesel method with the use of heavy fuel oils. 
Fuel and Oil Pipes 
The fuel and oil pipes should be double, at least be-
tween.the fire wall and engine or pump. Figure 4 shows a 
double fuel . ..pipe
	
1) fire wall; 2) copper wires; 3) car-
buretor; .4) spiral wire; 5) outside drain' pipe. Figure 5 
shows the details of such a pipe: a) 'inner pipe; b) outer 
pipe; c) control cock; a) connecting flang; e) nut for 
inner pipe; f) nut for outer pipe; g) packing ring. In 
order to keep the two pipes from rubbing together the inner 
pipe is wound with a spiral wire of light metal or with some 
elastic material not affected by the fuel. The outer pipe 
has a small drain Dipe extending outside and provided with a 
coci. If the inner pipe breaks the fuel does not flow into 
the enginc compartment, but continues to flow through the 
outer pine to the pump or carburetor. Before every take-
off and after every landing the tip htnes of the inner pipe 
can be verified by opening the above-mentioned cock. Simi-
lar models were exhibited by the D.V.L. at the 1928 Berlin 
International Aeronautic Exposition. As shown in Figure 6, 
double pipes have already demonstrated their efficacy not 
only in practical operation but also in accidents.. 
A possibility for the extensive avoidance of pipe 
breaks in general consists in the use of flexible elastic 
tubing for the fuel and oil pipes between the engine and 
fire wall. Such pipes have already been successfully used.. 
One was tested by the D.V.L. in January, 1928. After a 25-
hour test during which the pi-Pe was filled with fuel under 
4oatm. pressure, the material showed no signs of deteriora-
tion. Figure 7, represents a longitudinal section of such a 
pip e. A spiral of tinned topper wire is covered with sev-
eral layers of thin leather. , over which are wound several 
layers of impregnated linen fabric. The whole is then sur-
rounded by a spiral wire.
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Not all kinds of flexible pipes are suitable for lubri-
cating oils, since some of them disintegrate soon under the 
action of the hot oil. Some kinds are surrounded with as-
bestos for better protection against fire. Flexible metal 
pipes (seamless) should not be ued for the present because 
those hitherto used are easily broken by the continuous vi-
brations. It is also desirable for flexible fuel and oil 
pipes to be double so that, in the event of a fire, they 
will not burn through so quickly and liberate fuel for the 
further spread of the flames. 
All pipes and control rods and cables should pass 
through the fire wall in such a way as not Only to facili- 
tate their installation and removal but also to reduce the 
fire hazards as much as possible. There should be no spaces 
through which the flames could reach the pilot's cockpit and 
thus interfere with the further control of the aircraft. 
Figures 8 to 12 suggest ways for passing pipes, rods and. 
cables through the fire wall. 
Fuel Pumps 
In Eost cases the fuel pumps are mounted on the engine 
under the hood. Such pumps generally consist of a number 
of parts and have several pipe connections. There is dan- 
ger that these connections may not be tight, and that con-
siderable quantities of fuel may collect in their vicinity. 
So far as possible a fuel pump should be completely encased 
and the casing should have a drainpipe leading outside the 
aircraft. If complete enclosure of the pump is not always 
practicable, at least the places where the fuel is forced 
out should be provided with drainp ipes extending outside. 
Nowadays pumps with built-in membranes or diaphragms 
are often used. Such pumps are provided with slots in the 
part where the diaphragm is applied so that, in the event 
of its being ruptured, the collected fuel may drain off and 
not affect the working of the pump. If the diaphragm breaks 
while the engine is running the fuel ther flows through the 
slots into the space around the engine. Under certain cir-
cumstances the fuel may even be forced through the slots 
under a slight pressure. Hence the outflow connections of 
such pumps should be provided with drainpipes, since the 
diaphragms oft en break. 
Obviously the best way would be to install the fuel 
pumps outside the engine space and provide them with remote 
driving gear. This might consist of a shaft with universal
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joint, or the pump could be operated by a small eletric mo-
tor. The electric pump can be installed in any desired lo-
cation, even in the fuel tank. The electric generator is 
best installed near the engine. There is urgent, need of 
some such system. There are already several improved fuel 
pumps including the Junkers and the Avionette. 
Fire "Cock 
The purpose of the fire cock is to stop all fuel flow 
to the engine on the outbreak of a fire. Its location do- 
ponds so.owhat on the location 'of the fuel tanks. An ac-
curate diagram of thefue1 system must be included in the 
spec if icati'ons and be put in 'a conspicuous place on every 
aircraft with special indication of the fire cock, perhaps 
in red. The desirability of simultaneously switching off 
the fuel pump and ignition and turning on the fire extin-
guisher by the action of the fire cock can not be decided' 
offhand. Tests would first have to be made in order to 
determine the best form of the different components of such 
a system, especially with regard to the matter of weight. 
It should be possible to operate the different components 
separately, as well as simultaneously. Fire during flight 
does not always necessitate landing. The pilot, after clos- 
ing the fire cock, should still be able to 'control all the 
other devices.
Pipe Connections 
In order to avoid pipe breaks and. thus reduce the fire 
hazards, no solder should be used. Hard soldering makes the 
pipes very brittle so that they break easily. All fuel and 
oil pipes should therefore have solderless joints. Many 
very practical pipe connections are now available, some of 
which have been tested by the D'.V.L. The nuts must be ad-
justable and capable of being securely locked. On long 
pipes the intermediate connections must be flexible, or at 
least so installed as to permit yielding. A comprehensive 
series of solderless pipe connections can be found in 
' tFakra" No,, 21, November 1, 1928 (bulletin of the Standard-
ization-Committee of the Motor-Vehicle Industry). 
Fuel and Oil Tanks 
The 'fuel and oil tanks must be installed as-far as pos-
sible from the engine, so that they will not be immediately
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reached by a fire breaking out under 'the engine hood. The 
compartment containing the tanks must be well ventilated. 
It would also be possible to fill the tank rooms with an 
incombustible gas and seal them up tightly. Perhaps the 
exhaust gases could be used for this purpose. 
In order to have as little fuel as possible on board 
in th& event of a forced landing, which is liable to result 
in a cxash, 'the tank may be installed in such fashion that 
it can. bereleased:by means of a hand lever. .(Fig. 13.) 
Since it' may not, be possible to install this device on every 
airplane, the fuel tanks may be provided with quick-emptying 
'devices with outlets at the bottom of the fuselage. The 
outlet pipe must
	 a large: as p:ssib1e in order to empty 
the' tanks quickly in, the event. 'of a fire' during flight or of 
a forced. landing.	 .	 '	 :	 . -	 ,'• . 
The, extent f' the rupture of• a tank and the scattering 
of. the fuel ':in a crash can be reduced by..putting inside the 
tank a hollow' body whose sizeears a certain ratio to that 
of the tank. The &eformation of thi.s -body will absorb a 
large share of the energy freed by the impact of the tank. 
The pressure, ioistiv:ity . ,of the holl-ow. body is adapted to 
that of the tank. ' Such tanks were tested 'by the D.V.LS 'in 
July', .1929.. Although enough such tests have not yet been 
made, it has been. demonstrat'e& 'that 'fuel tanks containing 
hollow bodies can withs.ta:d greater .impact treses than 
ordinary tanks. This is clearly shown by Figures 14 and 15. 
Further tests of this kind should be made. 
Fuel tanks have been covered with a special rubber-like 
or gummy- skin. In the event of the, wall of the tank being 
puncture'd, by a structural member or, by a bullet, this skin 
would immediately close the hole and prevent the escape of 
the.. fuel,. Several tests were made in America with this sort 
of tank. These tests are said to have been successful, 
though no results were published. 
Tests were made in England with a device which, in the. 
event of a crash, automatically shuts off the fuel and may 
be used for the simultaneous operation of a fire extinguish-
er or the breaking of the electric circuit. The device con-
sists of a glass vacuum bulb which, when the airplane :crash 
es, is broken against a sharp edge installed for this pur- 
pose. The negative pressure produced by the breaking of the 
bulb operates the safety devices.
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Exhaust Pipes 
The fire hazards are greatly affected by the form and 
arrangement of the exhaust manifold and pipes. The manifold 
connections which are attached to the cylinders must lie out-
side the engine housing and be exposed to the wind.. Where 
this arrangement is not practicable the portions of the man-
ifold connections ins°id.é the engine housihg must be shut off 
from the rest of th engine space so that fuel deposits can 
not come in contac.t with the hot parts which may reach, dur- 
ing operation, a temperature of 350 to 500°C (662 to 932°F.) 
or even higher. 
The construction of the exhaust manifold from light 
metaiwith cooling fins may koop the temperature of the out-
er wall below 250 0 0 (482°F.), if this type can be made suf-
ficiently safe. Tests were made at the D.V.L. with an ex-
haust manifold from a German factory but the results do not 
yet warrant any final conclusion. (Fig. 16.) Further ex-
p•erimentation in this direction is desirable and will be 
undertaken in the near future. 
In order to prevent the escaping fuel, in the event of 
a crash, from being ignite& by the hot manifold, it might 
be possible to install a device for spraying the manifold 
with a liquid which would cool the manifold enough in a few 
seconds so the fuel could not ignite.. 
Preheating Devices. 
In water-cooled engines the peheating of the intake 
air has no particularly unfavorable effect on the fire haz-
ards because it is accomplished either by dawiig the air 
through the engine housing or by the return flow of the oil 
or heated cooling water. On air-cooled engines, preheating 
of the intake air by the exhaust gases is allowed in Germany 
only when the exhaust and hot-air conduits are situated out-
side the engine housing. 
Then, due to special structural conditions, a preheat-
ing device roust be installed under the engine hood, the pre- 
heating pipes must be shielded. from tie fuel and oil pipes 
or run through other pipes so that leaking fuel can not come 
in contact with them. The question of preheating will be 
conoiderod more in detail in a later report.
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Magnetos, Spark Plugs, Ignition Cables 
These must be well insulated. All fuel and. oil pipes 
should be located., in so far as possible, below the ignition 
system so that the latter will not be sprayed with leaking 
fuel or oil. The connections must not be affected by vibra-
tions. Electric cables must be enclosed in an insulating 
tube so that-if one of them becomes disconnected it can not 
come in contact with the engine or engine housing.
	 - 
On aircraft provided with a radio plant, the insulated 
cablesare enclosed in a metal tube for better protection. 
The danger from sparks is thus greatly reduced, since the 
metal covering is connected with the main mass of metal. 
This method of shielding has been largely adopted. in other 
countries.
	
- - -.	 -	 - 
-Since the complete encasing of the distributor does not 
appear advisable under certain conditions, duo, to the forma-
tion of ozone by the sparks, and since the life-of the spark 
plug is already shor:tened by acid deposits and orrosTion of - 
the -metal for lack of sufficient ventilation, the space a- - - 
round the distributor should be ventilated by the introduc-
tion of fresh air -from outside the air p lane. This method, 
however, may not always be practicable. The placing of a 
wire screen over an orifice of the distributor should gener-
ally suffice. The ventilation is not affected by the screen. 
No case has yet been known where fire was started by sparks - 
from the distributor.
Electric Plant 
A prerequisite condition for the further reduction in 
the number of aircraft fires is the suitable installation 
of the electric wires. When installing a system of elec-
tric wires, great care should be taken to avoid the possi-
bility of short-circuiting. It is one of the most important 
duties of inspectors and mechanics to see that the electric 
wires are correctly installed and always in perfect condi-
tion.	 - 
In order to avoid danger of igniting the fuel mixture 
by sparks from the electric equipment, special attention 
must be given to the shielding of the switches and commu-
tator. Suitable forms for the elements under consideration 
are included in the German specifications for airplane con-
struction afld are strictly required by the air traffic com-
panies.	 -	 -
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In crashes there is always danger of sparks from the 
breaking of copper cables and contact of the copper core 
with other electric conductors. It has been found that this 
can. be prevented by covering the cable with a wax coating 
which, in the event of a. break, is elongated by the tension 
and covers the 'broken-wire ends. All electric wires should 
therefore be covered with wax. The danger of short-circuit' -
'ing can be further diminished by the general use of bipolar 
wiring. 
Another safety device adopted by the Grman Luft-.Hansa 
Company on all its airplanes. is, a short-circuit push button 
which melts a safety fuse and shuts off the current from the 
whole system.	 ..	 .	 .	 . 
The location of the generators and storage batteries is 
also important. These should be installed as far aft as pos.- 
sible because the rear part of the fuselage is generally the 
least damaged;in a crash. A further advantage of this ar-
rangement is the long distance between the generator and the 
fuel tan!:. This manner of installation can generally be 
adopted, however, only on large airplanes with special power 
plant or fan drive of the generator. , There is an increasing 
tendency to operate the generator by the engine. This makes 
it necessary to install the generator near the engine, thus 
necessitating snecial consideration of the fire hazards.' 
The' radio plant must be installed with special care. 
The German Luft-Hansa has already adopted numerous safety 
devices which have proved very satisfactory. One is an in-, 
sulated fireproof case for the radio instruments, including 
a switch for cutting off the -radio generator. 
Fire Wall 
The fire wall, separating the engine from the pilot and 
passenger cabins, must be flame-tight and flameproof and 
made of material capable of withstanding the flames for a 
long time. It now generally consists of an asbestos sheet 
enclosed between two duralumin sheets about 0.5 mm (0.02 
in.) thick, in part of sheet duralurnin alone. Experience 
has shown that such a fire wall is not effective in all cas-
es. In one airplane fire the duralumin portion of the fire 
wall .as completely consumed while parts made of sheet steel 
remained intact.  
In most cases the fire wall 'consists of several pieces 
of sheet metal which abut one another and are riveted to-
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gether by means of overlapping st±'i p s of.metal with inter-
vening strips of asbestos. Fuel gets between the metal 
parts of the joint and saturates the asbestos. In case of 
fire under the engine hood this point is quickly attacked 
and the fuel-saturated asbestos is liable to be explosively 
torn out. The fire then reaches the parts of the airplane 
behind the fire wall. Even before the fire the asbestos 
strips may have been destroyed by the vibrations. 
When the fire wall consists of several xiiêtal sheets 
they must overlap. The best material is sheet steel with 
asbestos lining. The D.V.L. is now conducting experiments 
in this connection. Sheet elektron should never be used. 
In the section on "Fuel and Oil Pipes reference has alread. 
been made to the necessity of the flame-tight passage of all 
pipes through the fire wall. 
Material for the Engine Cowling 
Sheet elektron or aluminum are often used for the en-
gine cowling. It is well known that sheet elektron burns 
readily under certain conditions. It should not be used for 
engine cowlings. Fire-extinguishing tests with burning sheet 
elektron have shown that burning portions are thrOwn off with 
exp losive violence when sprayed with carbon tetrachloride. 
In a test with a dry extinguisher it was likewise impossible 
to smother the burning parts. 
Figures 17 to 19 show tests with elektron engine cowl-
ings. In these tests the time required for the ignition of 
sheets of diffeent; thicknesses was found to vary. A sheet 
0.8 mm (0.03 in.) thick ignited quicker than a sheet 1 mm 
(0.04 in.) thick. The thicker sheet burned, more intensely 
however. No definite conclusion can yet be drawn from these 
tests. Further tests will be undertaken at the D.V.L. in 
the near future. 
Protection against Back-Firing 
In order to diminish the fire hazards from back-firing 
wire screens may be inserted in the intake pipes to prevent 
the flames from reaching the carburetor. There are various 
forms of protective divices against back-firing. It is yet 
to be determined whether these devices cause much loss in 
engine power. Tests would also have to be made in order to 
determine whether back fires' can be prevented from reaching 
the carburetor by structural changes.
	 . S
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Safety Measures for Refueling.in the Air 
In the transfer of fuel aid oil in the air from one 
airplane to another, the most elaborate fire-prevention 
measures have been developed. In a system developed by the 
D.V.L. the refueling hose., when subjected to excessive ten-
sion,.automatically separates from its connection with the 
lower airplane. Simultaneously a valve at the lower end of 
the hose automatically closes so that no fuel can escape. 
It can be determined only'y further experimentation as to 
how m'i.cli the fire hazards from refueling in the air can be 
further reduced.
IV. FIRE FIGHTING 
General Statements Regarding Fire Extinguishers 
In order to fight a fire successfully, whether the 
burning aircraft is in the air or on the ground, it must 
carry apparatus specifically designed for this purpose. 
There are various extinguishers for fighting incipient and 
advanced, fires. Some of the hand extinguishers have been 
adopted for general industrial purposes. Only a few are 
suitable for use on aircraft. Several have been tested by 
the D.V.L. There is still need of further improvement. 
Fire-Extinguishing and Pressure-Producing 
Substances for Fire Extinguishers 
The only available fire-extinguishing substances for 
aircraft are carbon tetrachloride and carbon dioxide. The 
latter is better fbr injection into the carburetor and air 
intakes but not for fires under the enine hood. Carbon 
dioxide is not much used, carbon, tetrachloride being more 
suitable. The strong extinguishing effect of this substance 
is well known. 
Dry extinguishing substances (powders) should not be 
used since in extinguishing a fire particles of the powder. 
may get into the carburetor and other open parts of the en-
gine (valve sirings and valve-stem guides). Theyr.iay also 
get into the . cylinder and cause the piston to seize, thus 
entailing an accident. Moreover, since the powder must be 
forced throxgh pipes to the various outlots,. a pipe may eas-
ily become stopped and thus render the extinguisher useless.
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The fire-extinguishing, substance must not injure the struc-
tural materials of thc aircraft. 
The vapors produced by spraying carbon tetrachloride on 
a fire are harmless to persons notwithstanding the presence 
of a little phosgene. The inhaling of large quantities of 
such gases causes a cough-exciting irritation, but without 
iiarrful results. 
The "Chemisch-Technische Reichsanstalt" experimented 
with carbon totrachloride and, after completion of the tests, 
announced the following results: "In. extinguishing. oil and 
benzol fires, as lihewiso oil-soaked cotton waste, in the 
absence of catalyzers, low phosgene values were found, 
reaching a maximura of hardly twenty milligrams per cubic 
meter." 
It .
 should be noted that these experiment•s were perform-
ed in closed poorly-ventilated rooms, while iii using carbon 
tetrachloride to extinguish fires on aircraft the generated 
vapors are carried quickly away by the wind, and: the air cur-
rents under the hood. 
The extinguishing substance must be effective at -4500 
(-49°F.) . Hence it is necessary to add something to the-
carbon tetrachloride, which crystalizes at about -22°C 
(-7.6 0F.), in order to lower its freezing point to -450C. 
The most suitable pressure-producing substances are 
compressed air and compressed nitrogen. An extinguisher 
which employs compressed air and maintains a continuous 
pressure can be provided. with an indicator so that it can 
be constantly regulated. It can also be readily refilled. 
An extinguisher whose operating pressure is produced 
at the time br the introduction of a pressure cartridge 
can not be regulated. The pressure cartridges must there-
fore be very carefully tested. (shaking device, etc.) to 
determine whether the operating pressure will last long 
enough. 
A continuous-oressure extinguisher may develop leaks 
in the connections and joints after a long time, while an 
extinguisher in which the pressure is produced only at the 
moment of using is not so liabl.e.to
 develop leaks. No de"' 
initQ press ure-roducing means can yet be prescribed for 
all extinguishërs,.oarticular.ly automatic ones.
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Hand. Extinguishers 
There must always be one or more hand extinguishers on 
an aircraft, accord.ing to the size of the passenger cabin, 
baae room., engine nacelle and pilot cockpit. A hand ex-
tinuisher must be conveniently located and easily removable 
from its support. It must also be possible to extinguish 
several successive fires with one and the same extinguisher. 
The meeting of this requirement depends more or less on the 
design of the extinguisher. On each extinguisher there 
should be: printed. instructions for its operation so 'that 
even 
	 passenger may be able, to use it. Each type must be 
specially approved and be tested beforehand in regard to its 
suitability for use on aircraft. All fire extinguishers 
should be inspected at least once in three months. Other 
conditions are described	 for Airplanes." 
At least one liter (about a quart) of the fire-extinguishing 
liquid should be provided, in view of the fact that the cabin 
extinguisher must also be available for engine fires. 
Figure 20 represents a cabin fire extinguisher ('the 
"Minimax ICa" hand extinguisher) tested by the D.V.L. The 
extinguisher is removed from its holder and the pin a 
driven in by striking it against something. This opens the 
pressure cartridge b and the compressed air (ornitrogen) 
forces the liquid through the, tubes c and d. into the 
pipe e. By turning the hand wheel f 'the liquid is re-
leased through the nozzle g. 
Automatic Fire Extinguihers and Alarms 
In Section II ("Causes of Fire"), it was stated that 
fires arc. esDccialiy liable to occur in the engine space 
whore, due to the engine cowling and the firewall, it can 
not be immediately observed by the pilot. The latter is not 
generally aware of such a fire until smoke or flames issue 
from the engine housing and not till then does he use the 
fire extinguisher. The fire may then be too big to be ex-
tinguished by the limited amount of extinguishing liquid 
that can be carried. 
It is therefore imp ortant 'to ihstall some device to 
warn thl pilot of the fire before' it is too late. Fire a-
larms have already been used successfully in other coun-
trios. Figure 21 sho,s afire alarm for automobiles which 
can also be used with slight modifications on aircraft. 
When the celluloid strip a is burned through, the spring 
b presses the knob c against the pole shoe d, thus
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closing the circuit through the cable e and. operating an 
optic or acoustic signal near the pilot. 
The best device of all appears to be a fire extinguish-
er which operates automatically o the outbreak of a firo 
and which can also be set in oporation by the pilot. Fig-
ures-22 to 24 show several Gorman automatic fire extinguish-
ers which have been tested by the D.V.L. and pronounced-
suitable for use on-aircraft.
	 . . 
Figure 22 shows the automatic extinguisher "Minimax 
Hap 1. 11 As soon as an ignition cartridge, installed inside 
the engine cowling and connected with the pressure pipe a, 
is released by tho-fire the pressure is transmitted through 
the pipe a to the cylinder; h, forcing the extinguishing 
liquid through the valve c into the pipe a. and through 
the nozzles situated in the engine-space. The cylinder b 
is provided with a monoracter e and a filling plug - f. The 
extinguisher is also provided with an electric hand release. 
Figure 23 shows the automatic fire extinguisher "Phylax-
Aero-Typ. 11
 The cartridge a is discharged by an ignition 
cap mounted inside the' engine cowling. The striker located 
in the -neck b of the cylinder c is pushed into the cyl-
inder and causes the reaction of the chemicals in the pres-
sure cartridge. The pressure thus developed forces the liq-
uid in the cylinder through the pipe d to the nozzles in 
the engine space. The extinguisher is also provided with a 
hand. release (mechanical or electrical). 
-	 Figure 24 shows the "Trutmania 1 ,1 11 carburetor fire ex-
tinguisher. The liquid fills the cylinder a, as likewise 
the pipes b as far as the automatic releases c under 
continuous pressure. As so-on as the fuse d. is melted by 
the fire, the bridge e is pushed from the orifice f by 
the liquid pressure and the liquid escapes. The liquid may 
also be made to flow to the engine through a hand-operated 
valve g at the top of the cylinder. The extinguisher is 
provided, with a manometer and a filling plug. 
The installation of automatic fire extinguishers should 
be stipulated in aircraft specifications. They should be 
installed on aircraft and inspected at intervals.of 4 to 5 
months. These measures are necessary in order to obtain ef-
fective extinguishers and. corresond.ingly greater safety for 
aviation.	 -
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Installation of Extinguisher for Engine Fires
on a Single-Enginé Airplane 
The cylinder containing the fire-extinguishing liquid 
should. be installed, if possible, in the cockoit so that it 
can be operated either by the pilot or mechanic and so that 
it may be easily cared for or replaced. It should bear 
cons p icuous label containing the following information: 
type, liquid, quantity of liquid., maximum and minimum oper-
atinG, pressure, manufacturer, factory number, inspection 
mark, test period, date of last inspection. 
The pipes must conform to the specifications for fuel 
and oil pipes. The number of s pray nozzles depends on the 
size and type of the engine, as well as on the kin of noz- 
zle. In general all the air Intakes, the carburetor, and 
the engine space must be provided with nozzles. The engine 
space is best protected by installing a nozzle in each of 
the four upper corners so that the whole space will be 
sprayed. Nozzles should also be installed near all espe-
cially endangered points (carburetor, fuel pum p s, oil pumps 
and lower part of engine space near fire wall). 
Arrangement of Extinguishers on Multi-Engine Airplanes 
This depends on whether the extinguisher is automatic 
or hand-operated. If the latter, the containers for all the 
engines are best located in the cockpit. In the case of 
automatic extinguishers, each engine nacelle may be provided 
with a separate extinguisher. It is advisable, however, to 
provide each of these extinguishers with a remote control 
which can be operated from the cock p it. The arrangement of 
the pipes and nozzles is the sane as on single-engine air-
planes. 
Figure 25 represents the installation of a two-liter 
automatic fire extinguisher on a water-coled engine. 
a) Cylinder with enclosed pressure cartridge. 
b) Automatic releases (ignition caps). 
c) Ignition-pressure pipes for actuating pressure-car-
tridge. 
d) Pipes for fire-extinguishing' liquid. 
e) Spraying nozzles. 
Figure 26 represents the installation of a one-liter 
automatic fire extinguisher on an air-cooled engine; legend 
same as for Figure 2.
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Fire Extinguisher for Passenger Cabin 
In the passenger cabin the hand extinguisher :iust be 
so placed as to be irnuediately recognizable and. easily re- 
movable )y a passenger. It should be large enough for an 
engine fire or for use outside the airplane in the hangar. 
Test Plant of D.V.L. 
The D.V.L. plant for testing fire extinguishers con-
sists of the fuselage of an old Fokkor airplane equipped 
with a biercedes D III a engine. The extinguisher is in-
stalled in the usual way and its effect is tested with the 
engine runningand. with an artificially produced fire. 
(Pig. 27.) The tests are -made in the slipstream from an-
other airplane placed in front of the test airplane so as 
to approximate the conditions of actual flight. 
A future re p ort will deal with the design of the whole 
power -p lant with regard to fire prevention and fire fighting 
and also with various fire-fighting devices. 
Translation by Dwight M. Miner, 
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Figs.9,10 Movable fittings for passage of double fuel 'pipe 
through fire wail 
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a,Inner pipe d,Connecting flange 
b,Outer pipe e,Nut for inner pipe 
c,Control cock f,Nut for outer pipe 
g,Packing ring
Fig.6 Double fuel pipe after fire. 
Inner pipe remained intact. 
x - x ,double pipe. 
Fig.15 Fuel tank after drop with 
inclosed hollow body.
Fig.14 Fuel tank after drop with-





















:;-	 I f 
------nt--- 





-I-L	 "Minimax Na."	 - 1 1






Auto-	 I I 
matic a) p1  extin-
guisher_-- I 
"Phylax-	 I 










Fig-4 Double fuel pipe 
i nt 
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No.528	 Figs .11,12,13,21. 
Pig.11 Cable manifold in fire wall. Fig-12 Control rod for ignition and 
gas.
Fig.13 Device for dropping fuel tank. Turning the lever a releases 
tank b from part c. 
Pig.21 Automobile fire alarm.

